MadridParticipa - Hortaleza
| General Information | |
| Original Name | MadridParticipa - Hortaleza |
| DB-ID | 0065 |
| English Name | MadridParticipa - Hortaleza |
| Level | 3 |
| Binding | Yes |
| Shadow election | No |
| Start Date | missing |
| End Date | missing |
| Election Period | missing |
| When did the electronic vote cast take place? |
In a Polling Station |
| Statistics | |
| Eligible Voters | 21.273 |
| Votes | 545 |
| Eligible Electronic Voters | 21.273 |
| Electronic Votes | 192 |
| Turnout | 2,56% |
| Electronic Turnout | 0,90% |
| Available channels | |
| Polling Place | yes |
| Postal Voting | no |
| Counting Machine | no |
| Voting Machine | no |
| Networked Voting machine | yes |
| Kiosk Voting | no |
| Remote Electronic Voting | no |
| Vendor | |
| Software | Pnyx |
| Main Provider | Scytl |
| Identification | |
| Username and Password | no |
| TAN | no |
| Signature Card | yes (please check) |
| Biometric properties | no |
| Other | no |
| Anonymity | |
| Voting Machine | no |
| Separate Machines | no |
| Pre-election | no |
| Election | no |
| Post Casting | yes |
| Other | Votes are encrypted using an election public key and digitally signed using the voters' digital certificates. The election private key used to decrypt the votes is split in shares distributed among the Electoral Board members. The reconstruction of the key is requires minimum subset (threshold) of the members. The decryption process uses a Mixing process that breaks any correlation between the decrypted votes and the original encrypted votes, preventing any correlation between clear-text votes and voters. |
| Comments | |
| Reference 1 | |
| Reference 2 | http://www.ub.edu/grepa/JMReniu/Avanzando_eng.pdf |
| Reference 3 | http://www.ub.edu/grepa/JMReniu/Informesociologico_ing.pdf |
| Reference 4 | Reniu Vilamala, J.M. (2005) Learning some lessons from the use of e-voting |
